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I pray that soon the good men and women in our Congress will ameliorate the plight of
families like the Cabrera-Alvarezes and give us humane laws that will not cause the
disintegration of such families.1
[T]he result we must reach is as unjust as it is unreasonable.2
[W]e urge the Attorney General to closely review the facts of this heartbreaking case.3

* William O. Douglas Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I am grateful for the comments
from Muneer Ahmad, Ahilan Arulanantham, Heather Gerken, Lucas Guttentag, Susan Hazeldean,
Dan Kanstroom, Chris Lasch, Peter Markowitz, and Nancy Morawetz, and am indebted to Stephen
Poellot and Travis Silva for superb research assistance. A portion of the material incorporated here
was previously published in Michael J. Wishnie, Proportionality: The Struggle for Balance in U.S. Immigration
Policy, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 431 (2011) and is included with the permission of the University of
Pittsburgh Law Review.
1. Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005) (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
2. Cheruku v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 662 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir. 2011) (McKee, C.J.,
concurring).
3. Martinez v. United States Att’y Gen., 413 F. App’x 163, 168 (11th Cir. 2011).
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Proportionality is the notion that the severity of a sanction should not be
excessive in relation to the gravity of an offense. The principle is ancient 4 and
nearly uncontestable,5 and its vitality is well established in numerous areas of
criminal and civil law,6 in the United States and abroad.7 Doctrinal and theoretical
debates concerning proportionality review of criminal sentences, civil punitive
damages awards, and other sanctions8 tend to focus on four distinct questions: the
justification for taking account of proportionality,9 which sanctions are sufficiently
punitive to require review,10 which of those are so disproportionate as to be
impermissible,11 and whether a court or legislature should decide the maximum
punishment the state may impose.12
The operation of contemporary immigration statutes regularly results in
entry of a deportation order that some federal judges consider unjust. Opinion
surveys also consistently indicate that a substantial portion of the public believes
the current immigration laws are too harsh and need reform.13 Gridlock in
Congress has prevented the modernization and reform of the statutes, however, in

4. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983); see also KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR
JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 14 (1998) (“The idea of
proportionality in sentencing has been part of our tradition since biblical times.”); Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1063–65 (2004) (tracing the
history of the principle of proportionality to the Magna Carta’s prohibition against excessive
punishment).
5. Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16 CRIME AND JUSTICE 55,
56 (1992); see also STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 160
(2010) (“[P]roportionality helps reconcile competing rights and interests in a workable way.”).
6. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559
(1996).
7. Thomas M. Franck, Proportionality in International Law, 4 LAW & ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
230 (2010).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (holding that proportionality review
is required under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 388–91 (1994) (requiring “rough proportionality” between government conditions for approval
of development and impact of proposed development on public interest); see also Barry L. Johnson,
Purging the Cruel and Unusual: The Autonomous Excessive Fines Clause and Desert-Based Constitutional Limits on
Forfeiture After United States v. Bajakajian, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 461, 478–86.
9. See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV.
677 (2005).
10. See, e.g., Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321; BMW, 517 U.S. 559; Dolan, 512 U.S. 374.
11. See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011; Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
12. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
13. Obama’s Ratings Little Affected by Recent Turmoil, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, June 24, 2010,
available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/627.pdf; Opinion Research Poll, CNN, July 27,
2010, at 7–8, available at http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2010/images/07/27/rel10f1a.pdf; Power and
the People, POLITICO, Aug. 16, 2010, at 10, available at http://www.politico.com/static/
PPM152_1008013_politicoreport.html.
OF
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ways that might ameliorate their most inhumane consequences.14 But neither the
administrative courts that adjudicate deportation cases nor the federal judiciary
that reviews those decisions is powerless to prevent unjust removals.
Immigration law, which is formally civil but functionally quasi-criminal, has
not previously been subject to judicial review for conformity to constitutional
proportionality principles arising under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, the textual source of the principle in criminal cases,15
nor under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the textual source of the
principle in civil punitive damages cases.16 Yet it is undisputed that the Due
Process Clause applies to immigration proceedings.17 Moreover, in a landmark
2010 decision, the Supreme Court declared that a criminal defense attorney’s
failure to advise a client of the immigration consequences of a conviction could
violate the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, because
deportation is a direct, not collateral, consequence of a conviction.18 The rationale
of this decision implies that removal orders that are the inevitable result of a
criminal conviction are subject to review for excessiveness under the Eighth
Amendment.
This Article contends that removal orders are subject to constitutional
proportionality review.19 A removal order is sufficiently punitive to trigger

14. Efforts to pass comprehensive immigration reform statutes failed in 2006 and 2007. S.
2611, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 1348, 110th Cong. (2007). Even the DREAM Act, which would have
provided a path to citizenship for a limited class of individuals who had entered the country as
children, could not pass the Senate in 2009. S. 3992, 111th Cong. (2010). See Julia Preston, Tweak in
Rule to Ease a Path to Green Card, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/01/07/us/path-to-green-card-for-illegal-immigrant-family-members-of-americans.html (“White
House officials acknowledge that there will be no progress before the November elections on
legislation the president supports to give legal status to millions of illegal immigrants.”).
15. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910); see also Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment:
“Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 576–90 (2005); Lee, supra note 9, at 687–99;
Rachel A. Van Cleave, “Death is Different,” Is Money Different? Criminal Punishments, Forfeitures, and Punitive
Damages—Shifting Constitutional Paradigms for Assessing Proportionality, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 217,
223–46 (2003).
16. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); see also Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the
Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 903–14
(2004).
17. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (holding that the Due Process Clause
guarantees fundamental fairness in removal proceedings); see also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21
(1982) (holding that due process protections apply in deportation proceedings).
18. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
19. Writing before the Supreme Court’s decisions in Padilla v. Kentucky and Graham v. Florida,
other scholars have argued that deportation may be a disproportional sanction in some cases, and
have recommended legislative solutions. Angela M. Banks, Proportional Deportation, 55 WAYNE L. REV.
1651, 1671–79 (2009) (noting that due process requires proportionality and proposing enactment of a
rights-based category of statutory relief from removal that would permit immigration judges to
consider factors necessary to ensure proportionality); Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1683, 1732–40 (2009) (proposing graduated system of sanctions for immigration
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constitutional proportionality review, and metrics adapted from the criminal
sentencing and civil punitive damages context are available to conduct the sort of
proportionality review that is well established in many other areas of law.
Moreover, the statutory provision requiring an immigration judge to “decide
whether an alien is removable from the United States” at the conclusion of
removal proceedings20 must be understood to incorporate Fifth and Eighth
Amendment proportionality principles, pursuant to the constitutional avoidance
canon of statutory interpretation21 and the guarantee of fundamental fairness in
immigration proceedings long recognized by the Supreme Court.22 Accordingly,
the obligation to conduct a proportionality review of removal orders extends to
immigration judges, as well as to the U.S. Courts of Appeals that review those
orders.
Proportionality review rarely results in a court displacing a criminal sentence,
punitive damages award, or other sanction,23 largely because of judicial deference
to legislative judgments and jury deliberations.24 Invalidation of a removal order
will also be infrequent. Nevertheless, a court should set aside a removal order as
constitutionally impermissible in the rare case where the punishment of the
removal order is grossly disproportionate to the underlying misconduct, just as the
Fifth and Eighth Amendments require in other contexts.
I.

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW OUTSIDE IMMIGRATION LAW

Proportionality “embodies, or seems to embody, notions of justice. People
have a sense that punishments scaled to the gravity of offenses are fairer than
punishments that are not. Departures from proportionality—though perhaps
eventually justifiable—at least stand in need of defense.”25 The concept is

violations). I argue that proportionality review in immigration cases is not merely advisable but
required under the direct command of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and in some cases
the Eighth Amendment as well.
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (2006).
21. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005) (construing immigration statute to
avoid constitutional difficulty and explaining that the constitutional avoidance canon “is a tool for
choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable
presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts”);
Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and
Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 397, 402 (2005) (defending
the avoidance canon as “not so much a maxim of statutory interpretation as it is a tool of
constitutional law”).
22. See infra notes 188–219 and accompanying text.
23. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 37 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I recognize the
warnings implicit in the Court’s frequent repetition [in its proportionality cases] of words such as
‘rare.’”); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (“[S]uccessful challenges to the proportionality
of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.”).
24. Id. at 23 (majority opinion) (emphasizing “primacy of the legislature”).
25. Von Hirsch, supra note 5, at 56; see also Mattias Kumm, The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the
Right to Justification: The Point of Rights-Based Proportionality Review, 4 LAW & ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
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important not only to retributivists, who focus on whether an individual receives a
just desert, but also to utilitarians, who argue that a failure to punish
proportionally is inefficient, fails appropriately to deter misconduct, and
undermines the rule of law.26 It may be understood best as a “side constraint that
embodies retributivism,” as Youngjae Lee has contended, limiting the sanction
that might otherwise be imposed consistent with deterrence, incapacitation, or
other theories of punishment.27
Notwithstanding debate about their theoretical justification, proportionality
requirements are well developed in the criminal law precedents, tracing back more
than a century28 and including more than ten Supreme Court decisions since 1980
addressing noncapital29 and capital sentences.30 In criminal cases, the “thicket of
Eighth Amendment [proportionality] jurisprudence”31 contains internal tensions,
but it is not difficult to discern certain basic principles. The Court’s approach
recognizes two distinct forms of proportionality review. The first is a “narrow
proportionality review,” which the Court has also referred to as the “gross

140, 141 (2010) (“Proportionality-based judicial review institutionalizes a right to contest the acts of
public authorities and demand a public reasons-based justification.”).
26. See Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263,
272–79 (2005); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 454
(1997) (“[B]ecause it promotes forces that lead to a law-abiding society, a criminal law based on the
community’s perceptions of just desert is, from a utilitarian perspective, the more effective strategy
for reducing crime.”).
27. Lee, supra note 9, at 742; see also NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
199 (1982) (“Desert is . . . a limiting principle. The concept of ‘just desert’ sets the maximum and
minimum of the sentence that may be imposed for any offense . . . . The fine-tuning is to be done on
utilitarian principles.”); STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 22 (“One widely shared understanding is
that even if deterrence of crime is the general aim of a system of criminal prohibitions, ‘just desert’ (or
retribution) should be a limit on the distribution of punishment.”).
28. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
29. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (holding that a life sentence for juvenile
offender who did not commit homicide violates Eighth Amendment proportionality requirement);
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (holding that a life sentence for seventh conviction for passing
bad check violates same). But see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (upholding life sentence for
California third-strike conviction); Ewing, 538 U.S. 11 (same); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957
(1991) (holding that a life sentence for cocaine possession is not constitutionally disproportional);
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (upholding forty-year sentence for possession and intent to
distribute nine grams of marijuana); Rummel, 445 U.S. 263 (upholding life sentence under Texas
recidivist statute for theft of $120).
30. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)
(holding that death sentence for defendant who was under eighteen years of age at the time of his
capital crime violates the Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that
death sentence for mentally retarded defendant violates the Eighth Amendment); Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding that death sentence for felony murder simpliciter with no finding of an
intent to kill is constitutionally disproportionate); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988)
(holding that death sentence for a murder committed when defendant was fifteen years of age violates
the Eighth Amendment).
31. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72; see also Lee, supra note 9, at 681 (characterizing modern
proportionality decisions as “messy and complex” and a “meaningless muddle”).
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disproportionality principle.” This is essentially a form of case-by-case analysis.32
The second is a categorical review, through which an entire class of criminal
punishment for a particular offense (e.g., capital punishment for a nonhomicide
offense) or for a particular population (e.g., juvenile offenders) is examined.
The case-by-case proportionality analysis requires a two-step inquiry. First,
the Court asks whether a particular criminal sentence is so excessive in relation to
the gravity of the offense as to raise an inference of “gross disproportionality.”33
For instance, in Solem, the Supreme Court concluded that a life sentence for
passing a bad check raised an inference of gross disproportionality,34 and in 2010,
Chief Justice John Roberts reached the same conclusion in another noncapital
case.35 On the other hand, a 5–4 majority of the Court in Ewing held that
California’s “three strikes” law did not raise an inference of gross
disproportionality on the facts of the case before it.36
In the rare case where a sentence is so excessive in relation to the offense as
to create an inference of gross disproportionality, the court will conduct two
comparative assessments: (1) an intrajurisdictional review examining other
sentences imposed for comparable offenses within the same jurisdiction and other
crimes for which the same sentence is imposed, and (2) an interjurisdictional
analysis considering how other jurisdictions punish similar offenses.37
Occasionally, a court will conclude that a sentence otherwise lawfully imposed is
so disproportionate as to be unconstitutional, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.38
This case-by-case proportionality analysis rarely leads to overturning a
sentence, and some scholars have concluded that the doctrine is moribund outside
the capital context,39 especially since the Court’s rejection of proportionality

32. See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Our decisions recognize that
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause encompasses a narrow proportionality principle.”). See also
John D. Castiglione, Qualitative and Quantitative Proportionality: A Specific Critique of Retributivism, 71 OHIO
ST. L.J. 71, 84–86 (2010); Stephen T. Parr, Symmetric Proportionality: A New Perspective on the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, 68 TENN. L. REV. 41, 57–58 (2000).
33. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005–06.
34. Solem, 463 U.S. at 291–303.
35. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2036 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (concluding
life sentence without possibility of parole for juvenile offender convicted of nonhomicide offense
failed gross disproportionality review).
36. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
37. Solem, 463 U.S. at 291, 299–300 (comparing sentences and noting that the defendant was
treated in “the same manner as, or more severely than, criminals who have committed far more
serious crimes” and “more severely than he would have been in any other State”).
38. See, e.g., id. at 303; Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
39. See e.g., Castiglione, supra note 32, at 84 (“[T]he narrow proportionality regime, which
prevails today, is generally considered to be an empty shell; it prohibits punishments that are ‘grossly
disproportionate,’ but almost never leads to the overturning of a sentence of a term of years.”).

Assembled_V2I1_v7_corrected (Do Not Delete)

2012]

THE PROPORTIONALITY REQUIREMENT

5/16/2012 11:36 PM

421

challenges to California’s “three strikes” law.40 The Supreme Court has insisted on
the vitality of the principle, however, and even in Ewing it affirmed that the
Constitution requires “gross disproportionality” review of individual sentences.41
Moreover, in 2010 Chief Justice Roberts concurred in Graham v. Florida on this
rationale, concluding that a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile
nonhomicide offender violated the “gross disproportionality” test on a case-bycase analysis.42 In other words, the demise of the doctrine may be overstated.
The Court’s second approach to considering whether a criminal sentence is
constitutionally proportional is categorical.43 Here, the judicial inquiry focuses on
the nature of the offense or the characteristics of the offender.44 The Court has in
a number of cases held that a punishment is grossly excessive for certain offenses
and for certain offenders.45
The judicial test for proportionality in these categorical cases is phrased
differently from that for proportionality on a case-by-case basis. A court “first
considers ‘objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative
enactments and state practice’ to determine whether there is a national consensus
against the sentencing practice at issue.”46 This analysis requires review of
statutory text, as well as consideration of practices on the ground, which often
differ from law on the books.47 The court may also examine foreign or
international practices.48 The court will then take into account “the culpability of
the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the
severity of the punishment in question,”49 and whether the penalty “serves
40. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 37; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72–74 (2003) (emphasizing,
in a companion case to Ewing, that “gross disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences for
terms of years” and holding that state court rejection of proportionality challenge to “three strikes”
law was not contrary to, or unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as required for
habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
41. Justice Thomas specifically dissented in Ewing to argue that no such constitutional
proportionality requirement exists, but the majority rejected that position. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 32
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In my view, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Amendment contains no proportionality principle.”).
42. 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2036 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
43. Id. at 2022 (majority opinion).
44. Id.
45. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) (holding death penalty impermissible for
rape of child not resulting and not intended to result in death); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568
(2005) (holding death penalty impermissible for seventeen-year-old homicide offender); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding death penalty impermissible for mentally retarded
offender); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (holding death penalty impermissible for
aiding and abetting in felony murder); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988)
(holding death penalty impermissible for fifteen-year-old homicide offender).
46. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2033 (listing Eighth Amendment cases where the Court “looked beyond our
Nation’s borders”); see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 70–
80 (2006).
49. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
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legitimate penological goals,”50 namely retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or
rehabilitation.
In its categorical proportionality opinions, the Court has held that capital
punishment is constitutionally impermissible for nonhomicide crimes51 and for
homicide committed by juvenile offenders52 or those with low intellectual
functioning.53 The latter cases place significant emphasis on the diminished
culpability of young persons and those with mental health or developmental
impairments, who do not bear the same moral responsibility for their actions as
mentally competent adults.54 For many years the Supreme Court applied its
categorical analysis exclusively in capital cases and reviewed proportionality
challenges to noncapital sentences only under the case-by-case standards for
proportionality. That changed in 2010, however, when Justice Kennedy wrote for
the Court that a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile nonhomicide
offender violated the constitutional command of proportionality under the
categorical approach.55
Proportionality as a constitutional command is not limited to the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause. Fines, penalties, and other civil sanctions may be
sufficiently punitive to require constitutional proportionality review under the
Fifth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. As
Justice Blackmun explained for the Court in Halper, “The notion of punishment,
as we commonly understand it, cuts across the division between the civil and the
criminal law.”56
In this regard, the Court has concluded that fines are subject to an
excessiveness review under the Excessive Fines Clause. In a case involving a man
who failed to disclose the full amount of cash he was lawfully carrying out of the
country and, subsequently, received a massive fine for what was essentially a
paperwork violation,57 the Court explained that “[t]he amount of the forfeiture
must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to

50. Id. See also Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 440–43; Panetti v. Quaterman, 551 U.S. 930, 957–60
(2007).
51. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding
that death sentence for rape is disproportionate).
52. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
53. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
54. See Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism, and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and the Role of
Child’s Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 272–73 (2005).
55. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030–33. Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the judgment but
would have ruled only on the narrower case-by-case proportionality grounds. Id. at 2036 (Roberts,
C.J., concurring).
56. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447–48 (1989).
57. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
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punish.”58 The Court went on to apply a version of case-by-case proportionality
analysis.59
The constitutional rule that a penalty must not be excessive in relation to the
underlying misconduct is also required when it comes to civil sanctions subject
only to Fifth Amendment, not Eighth Amendment, scrutiny. For instance, in the
land use case, Dolan v. City of Tigard,60 the Supreme Court used a form of case-bycase analysis that it called “rough proportionality.” The Court reasoned that under
the Takings Clause, “[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city
must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication
is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”61
Proportionality is also required by the Due Process Clause, and it is in this
context that the doctrine is best developed in civil cases. In its punitive damages
precedents, the Supreme Court initially held that such awards were immune from
substantive judicial review62 but eventually revised its position and concluded that
such awards are subject to a proportionality analysis very similar to that under the
Eighth Amendment.63 In BMW v. Gore, the Court established three “guideposts”
for assessing whether a punitive damages award was constitutionally permissible:
(1) reprehensibility of the underlying conduct, (2) ratio of punitive damages award
compared to harm to plaintiff and other conceivable victims (compensatory
damages), and (3) comparison of punitive damages award to other civil and
criminal penalties that could be imposed for similar conduct.64 In State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the Court went further, articulating a
categorical-type rule that “few [punitive damages] awards exceeding a single-digit
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will
satisfy due process.”65
BMW v. Gore reads much like a case-by-case proportionality decision in a
noncapital case. The Court starts by considering the severity of the sentence in
relation to the gravity of the offense, and in the uncommon case continues on to
various comparative analyses. And the conclusion in State Farm is essentially a
categorical holding for punitive damages cases. Indeed, scholars have noted that
judicial scrutiny of disproportionate civil sanctions, such as punitive damages,
58. Id. at 334.
59. See id. at 336; see also Lee, supra note 9, at 729–30; Sheila B. Scheuerman, The Road Not
Taken: Would Application of the Excessive Fines Clause to Punitive Damages Have Made a Difference?, 17
WIDENER L.J. 949, 961–62 (2008); Van Cleave, supra note 15, at 250–53.
60. 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
61. Id.; see also E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES
IN AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 74–80 (2009); K.G. Jan
Pillai, Incongruent Disproportionality, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645, 655–58 (2002).
62. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont,
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
63. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
64. Id. at 574–83.
65. 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
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appears to be more searching than review of criminal sentences.66 This close
scrutiny of civil punishments suggests that there is an important judicial role in
reviewing the proportionality of civil immigration sanctions, such as deportation.
II. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW IN IMMIGRATION LAW
In recent years, courts have decried the harsh consequences of our
immigration laws in particular cases,67 but I am not aware of any decision by an
Article III or administrative court in the United States that has evaluated whether
deportation is disproportional to the underlying misconduct. Removal orders,
however, should be subject to proportionality review by courts and immigration
judges, both on a case-by-case basis and categorically.
Proportionality is required under the Eighth Amendment, at least in cases
where a removal order is the result of a criminal conviction; as the Supreme Court
observed in Padilla v. Kentucky, “deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes
the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen
defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”68 Proportionality is also a
command of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause even where deportation
is not the result of a criminal conviction. This is so because the Supreme Court
has explained that if any part of a sanction is punitive, then the entire sanction
may be subject to proportionality review.69 Because a removal order mandates
departure70 and also bars lawful return for a period of years,71 removal orders are
subject to judicial review on constitutional proportionality grounds even where the
individual has not been convicted criminally.72 Further, the immigration statutes
66. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1051 (noting the “cruel irony . . . that too many years
in prison for shoplifting does not violate the Constitution but too much money in punitive damages
against a business for ‘manslaughter’ is unconstitutional”); Karlan, supra note 16, at 910 (contrasting
the “Court’s retreat from proportionality review in the criminal context” with “its enthusiastic
embrace in the punitive damages cases”).
67. See, e.g., Cheruku v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 662 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir. 2011)
(McKee, C.J., concurring); Martinez v. United States Att’y Gen., 413 F. App’x 163, 168 (11th Cir.
2011) (noting “heartbreaking” consequences of removal of mother of young children who had
escaped domestic abuse); Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Pregerson, J., dissenting).
68. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
69. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447–48 (1989).
70. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (“We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly
severe ‘penalty. . . .’”) (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893)); Delgadillo
v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390–91 (1947) (“Deportation can be the equivalent of banishment or
exile.”) (citing Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945)); Bridges, 326 U.S. at 154 (1945) (“Though
deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual . . . .
That deportation is a penalty—at times a most serious one—cannot be doubted.”).
71. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i), (ii)(II) (2006) (stating that a person who has been ordered
removed may not lawfully return to the United States for five, ten, or twenty years, or ever, depending
on circumstances).
72. Immigration fines, such as those imposed on employers found to have knowingly hired or
employed an unauthorized worker, may also be subject to proportionality review. See United States v.
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must be construed so as to avoid requiring entry of a constitutionally
disproportionate removal order, thus extending to immigration judges the
obligation to conduct a proportionality review before entering a removal order.
A. Removal as a Punitive Sanction
Is a removal order sufficiently punitive that it is subject to a constitutional
proportionality requirement, under the Fifth or Eighth Amendment? The
Supreme Court has stated that deportation proceedings are civil, not criminal,73
and that deportation itself is not punishment, at least as that term is understood
for the purpose of certain constitutional provisions.74 As a result, requirements of
constitutional criminal procedure such as the right to counsel,75 the rule against
admissibility of illegally-obtained evidence,76 and the prohibition on ex post facto
laws77 do not apply in civil removal proceedings. Yet the civil/criminal distinction
is not dispositive for proportionality analysis, as confirmed by the excessive fines,
punitive damages, and land use takings cases, all of which involve scrutiny of a
civil sanction for conformity to constitutional proportionality requirements.
Rather, the decisive classification for proportionality review is whether a sanction
is remedial or punitive. If deportation is wholly remedial, without any punitive
element, then proportionality review is not required by the Constitution.78 Nor,

Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (Excessive Fines Clause requires proportionality review). See generally
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f) (2006) for the criminal penalties for engaging in a pattern or practice of employing
unauthorized foreign nationals.
73. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (holding that ordinary Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply in deportation proceedings, which are civil, except in
cases of egregious violations).
74. See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrim. Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) (“While the
consequences of deportation may assuredly be grave, they are not imposed as a punishment.”); Fong
Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730 (holding that constitutional protections for criminal defendants “have no
application” in civil deportation proceedings).
75. See, e.g., Debeatham v. Holder, 602 F.3d 481, 485 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that there is no
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in immigration proceedings).
76. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032.
77. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 314 (1955) (stating that ex post facto clause does not
apply to retroactive application of immigration statute); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 722–24 (same).
Courts have held that the Due Process Clause, which governs the conduct of removal proceedings,
incorporates weaker versions of some rules of criminal procedure, such as the exclusionary rule,
Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 234–37 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding exclusionary rule applies
in removal proceedings in cases of egregious violations); Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441,
1448–49 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that “egregious Fourth Amendment violations warrant the
application of the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings”), and the rule against retroactive enforcement
of statutes, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315–20 (2001) (utilizing presumption against retroactive
application of statutes to construe ambiguous immigration provision).
78. Banks, supra note 19, at 1656 (“[T]he key question in determining whether or not a
sanction is punishment is not whether it is criminal or civil, but whether it is remedial or punitive.”);
id. at 1658 (arguing that proportionality review is appropriate in immigration cases only where there is
“initial determination that deportation is punitive rather than remedial”).
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then, would the immigration statutes need to be construed to incorporate a
proportionality review so as to avoid constitutional difficulty.
The Supreme Court’s guidance on classifying a government sanction as
punitive or remedial displays “significant methodological turmoil.”79 Nevertheless,
some principles can be divined from two overlapping lines of precedent, in which
the Supreme Court has considered cases involving a civil proceeding challenged as
violative of the Double Jeopardy or Excessive Fines Clause.
Litigants have occasionally argued that a proceeding termed civil by a
legislature is nevertheless substantively so punitive that it must be deemed criminal
for double jeopardy purposes.80 To analyze such a claim, courts begin with the
legislative characterization and set aside the civil label for double jeopardy
purposes only upon significant evidence of the factors outlined in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez.81 This standard is a high one and is rarely satisfied in modern
cases.
Scholars have contended that deportation proceedings are quasi-criminal,
containing both criminal and civil aspects, and that therefore more constitutional
criminal procedure norms should apply.82 These arguments tend to focus on
deportation of lawful permanent residents, in circumstances that Daniel
Kanstroom has described as reflecting “post-entry social control.”83 There is force

79. Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard
Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1925–26 (2000); see also Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact or
Fiction: The Legal Construction of Immigration Removal for Crimes, 27 YALE J. REG. 47 (2010).
80. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (overruling Halper in part and holding
criminal prosecution following civil monetary penalty and administrative debarment proceeding does
not violate double jeopardy); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 287–88 (1996) (“[C]ivil [in rem]
forfeiture does not constitute punishment for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); Dep’t of
Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994) (imposition of state “dangerous drug tax”
constituted punishment for double jeopardy purposes); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989)
(prosecuting civil claim under False Claims Act following criminal prosecution was criminal
punishment in violation of Double Jeopardy Clause); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980)
(emphasizing deference to legislative classification of sanction as civil or criminal for double jeopardy
purposes); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (elaborating six-factor test to
determine whether sanction classified by legislature as civil is sufficiently punitive to be deemed
criminal for double jeopardy analysis).
81. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99–100 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248–49) (explaining that a court
must “first ask” whether legislature applied civil or criminal label, but should also consider MendozaMartinez factors to determine “whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or
effect” as to render the sanction a criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes).
82. Kanstroom, supra note 79; Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 469 (2007); Robert Pauw, A
New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections
Must Apply, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 305, 323–25 (2000) (arguing that at least some deportation
proceedings should be viewed as quasi-criminal); see also Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1350 (2011) (arguing that deportation cases are neither truly civil nor
criminal, but should be understood as residing “in the space between the two realms”).
83. DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY
(2007); Kanstroom, supra note 79.
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to these views, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla confirms them in some
cases. Because proportionality is a requirement of the Due Process Clause as well
as the Eighth Amendment, however, these arguments bolster, but are unnecessary
to, my contention that removal orders are subject to proportionality review, even
where the deportation order is indisputably civil.
Unlike the double jeopardy precedents, in cases arising under the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, the Court has looked to history,
congressional intent, and the relationship of the fine to the underlying misconduct
to determine whether a government sanction is sufficiently punitive to trigger
review for excessiveness.84 The standard has been less exacting in practice, as
demonstrated most plainly by the Court’s conclusion that a civil forfeiture may be
sufficiently punitive to trigger review under the Excessive Fines Clause, even if not
punitive enough to constitute criminal punishment for double jeopardy
purposes.85 This may reflect the Court’s willingness to restrain egregious civil
sanctions (as reflected in the lower standard for what constitutes punishment
under the Excessive Fines Clause), even when reluctant to prohibit the sanction
outright (as would be required from a conclusion that the same sanction
constituted punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause).
1.

Removal of Permanent Residents

For proportionality review, the question is whether deportation is wholly
remedial (such that the Constitution imposes no proportionality requirement), or
whether it is punitive at least in part (such that it does). Maureen Sweeney has
argued that where a conviction results in the automatic deportation of a
permanent resident, “removal functions as punishment for wrongdoing” and thus
should not be “grossly disproportionate to the offense.”86 In 2010 the Court
appears to have accepted these contentions, at a minimum as to permanent
residents who are removable because of a criminal conviction.87 Deportation is,
the Court emphasized, a “particularly severe ‘penalty.’”88 And because “recent
changes in our immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic result” of
conviction for many offenses,89 it is “‘most difficult’ to divorce the penalty from
84. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609–19 (1993) (concluding civil forfeiture is
punishment subject to Excessive Fines Clause); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998)
(same).
85. Compare Austin, 509 U.S. at 609 (concluding civil forfeiture is punishment subject to
excessive fine review), and Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 333–34 (same), with Ursery, 518 U.S. at 287 (holding
that civil forfeiture is not punishment subject to Double Jeopardy Clause).
86. Sweeney, supra note 79, at 87–88; see also Banks, supra note 19.
87. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010); see also Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332
U.S. 388, 391 (1947) (“Deportation can be the equivalent of banishment or exile.”) (citing Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945)).
88. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740
(1893)).
89. Id. at 1483.
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the conviction in the deportation context.”90 Any insistence that removal is not
punitive thus fails in the face of Padilla, as well as for the reasons articulated by
Kanstroom and others, in cases involving permanent residents convicted of
crimes which render their removal “nearly an automatic result.”
One might respond that the Padilla holding that deportation is an “integral
part” of the penalty imposed upon conviction of a criminal offense means that
removal must be taken into account in an Eighth Amendment proportionality
challenge to the conviction. This may well be so. But if deportation as the “nearly . . .
automatic result” of a conviction is a “penalty,” as the Padilla Court concluded,
then the removal order itself must also be subject to Fifth Amendment
proportionality review in the immigration proceedings.
The government removes few lawful permanent residents (LPRs) on
grounds other than conviction of a criminal offense, but it does remove some, for
instance for immigration fraud. Where one has secured permanent resident status
by misrepresentation, deprivation of LPR status may be solely remedial. But
removal itself may still be punitive, for reasons discussed below regarding removal
of non-LPRs.
2.

Removal of Non-LPRs

Is removal of a person other than a permanent resident sufficiently punitive to
be subject to constitutional proportionality review?91 The Court has emphasized
that when a government sanction is intended other than for a remedial purpose,
even in part, then it is a penalty. In other words, a “civil sanction that cannot fairly
be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also
serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come
to understand the term.”92 To the extent that a removal order is punitive, even in
part, its imposition must satisfy constitutional proportionality requirements.
A “penalty” is “the suffering in person, rights, or property that is annexed by
law or judicial decision to the commission of a crime or public offense,” as one
dictionary states its primary definition.93 Many foreign nationals have of course
90. Id. (quoting United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
91. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 19, at 1658 (declining to examine whether removal of persons
who have evaded “border controls through surreptitious entry, fraud, or misrepresentation” is subject
to constitutional proportionality requirements because removal in such circumstances is “essentially
remedial in nature”); Sweeney, supra note 79.
92. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) (emphasis added); see also Austin v.
United States, 509 U.S. 602, 620–22 (1993). Halper was abrogated in part by Hudson v. United States,
522 U.S. 93 (1997) (overturning double jeopardy holding of Halper), but the Court’s Excessive Fine
Clause analysis in Austin was undisturbed. Matthew C. Solomon, The Perils of Minimalism: United States
v. Bajakajian in the Wake of the Supreme Court’s Double Jeopardy Excursion, 87 GEO. L.J. 849 (1999).
93. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 915 (Frederick C. Mish et al. eds., 11th
ed. 2009); see also id. at 1009 (defining “punish” as “to impose a penalty on for a fault, offense, or
violation; to inflict a penalty for the commission of (an offense) in retribution or retaliation”);
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1353 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “punishment” as “[a] sanction—such as a
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developed substantial ties within this country prior to the commencement of a
removal proceeding against them—bonds of family, community, employment,
faith, and otherwise. Most painfully, removal is frequently destructive of family
integrity. In reality, the removal order entered against a non-LPR must be
understood as a penalty in many cases. Deportation of persons who arrived at a
young age or who have long resided in this country “bristles with severities,”94
even when the person is not a permanent resident.
Foreign and international law increasingly recognize that removal may be a
disproportionate sanction, especially where it will impact minor children or
destroy family unity.95 A number of international instruments recognize the
importance of family unity and the right of parents to raise their children and of
children to reside with their parents.96 The Convention on the Rights of the Child,
for instance, provides that “State Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be
separated from his or her parents against their will,” except under lawful
procedures and upon a determination that “such separation is necessary for the
best interests of the child.”97 Additional proposed instruments would also
strengthen proportionality as a constraint on the power to deport.98

fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or privilege—assessed against a person who has
violated the law”); id. at 1247 (defining “penalty” as “[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer, usu. in
the form of imprisonment or fine; esp., a sum of money exacted as punishment for either a wrong to
the state or a civil wrong (as distinguished from compensation for the injured party’s loss). Though
usu. for crimes, penalties are also sometimes imposed for civil wrongs.”).
94. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588 (1952).
95. Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 603–05 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (immigration statutes
must be construed in harmony with customary international law, which prevents arbitrary interference
with family unity and protects best interest of child), rev’d on other grounds, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003).
96. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 16, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc.
A/810 at 71 (1948) (“The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled
to protection by society and the State.”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17,
Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (prohibiting “arbitrary or unlawful interference
with . . . family [or] home”); Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 7, 28 I.L.M. 1456, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 (guaranteeing “as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her
parents”); see also DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW
AMERICAN DIASPORA (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 250–67) (on file with author) (describing
the application of human rights and international law norms, including proportionality, to
immigration proceedings); Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of International
Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 213 (2003). The United States is not a signatory to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child.
97. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 96, 28 I.L.M. at 1460, 1577 U.N.T.S. at
47.
98. See International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, Art. 56(3), U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990);
International Migrant Bill of Rights (Draft in Progress), 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 399, 402 (2010) (“States shall
establish opportunities for relief from removal for migrants who have a substantial connection to the
host country or for whom removal would impose serious harm, either due to family relationships or
conditions in the State to which he or she would be removed.”).
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The European Court of Human Rights has held that deportation must be
“proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued,”99 which requires consideration of
the individual’s circumstances as well as the State’s interest in removal. In 2011 the
European Court of Justice enjoined the refusal of Belgium to grant residency and
employment authorization to the parent of an EU national child because to force
the separation of the child and parent (if the child did not accompany the parent
upon departure) or the constructive deportation of the child (if she did accompany
the parent) would deny the child her rights as an EU national.100 In reviewing
removal orders entered in the United States, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights concluded that “it is well-recognized under international law that a
Member State must provide non-citizen residents an opportunity to present a
defense against deportation based on humanitarian and other considerations.”101
It is no answer, in human terms, to say that the establishment of these
human relationships was tainted from the outset by one’s unlawful arrival or
extended stay. The immigration statutes prohibit residence beyond the expiration
of a visa as well as entry into the nation without inspection at the border.102 In
some circumstances they bar employers from hiring a person.103 But they do not
ban marriage, childrearing, school attendance,104 acceptance of employment,105
formation of relationships with friends and neighbors, religious observance, or
many other forms of community. Moreover, one may readily acknowledge the
government’s broad power to deport foreign nationals106 while also insisting that
exercise of that power can, in some instances, impose a suffering the law deems
punitive. The forcible, enduring, and possibly permanent severing of these ties is
frequently “heartbreaking,”107 and it is a “savage penalty”108 in the everyday sense
of the word.

99. Dalia v. France, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 14–15.
100. Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office national de l’emploi (ONEm), 2011
ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 82 (“A refusal to grant a right of residence to a third country national with
dependent minor children in the Member State where those children are nationals and reside, and also
a refusal to grant such a person a work permit,” violates Article 20 of Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, 9.5.2008).
101. Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendariz, et al. v. United States, Case 12.562, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 81/10, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.139, doc. 21 ¶ 5 (2010); see also id. at ¶ 56 (“[T]he IACHR
particularly emphasizes that the best interest of minor child must be taken into consideration in a
parent’s removal proceeding.”); KANSTROOM, supra note 96 (manuscript at 255–62) (discussing
Smith/Armendariz IACHR decision).
102. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006).
103. Id. § 1324a(a)(1).
104. Children have a constitutional right to attend public primary and secondary schools
regardless of immigration status. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
105. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
106. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588 (1952). See also Michael J. Wishnie,
Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 493 (2001) (analyzing exclusive nature of the federal government’s broad immigration powers).
107. Martinez v. United States Attorney General, 413 F. App’x 163, 168 (11th Cir. 2011).
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B. Re-entry Bars as a Punitive Sanction
Whether entered against permanent residents or others, today all removal
orders contain an additional feature that is undeniably punitive—imposition of a
ban on lawful return for at least five years and in some cases, forever. The length
of the re-entry bar depends on various factors, but it is imposed in all cases: five
years (if the removal order is entered upon one’s arrival or attempted entry into
the United States),109 ten years (if the removal proceedings is commenced after
one’s initial entry),110 twenty years (if the removal order is a second or subsequent
order),111 or a lifetime ban (if the person was convicted of an “aggravated
felony”).112
The ban on return cannot be justified in remedial terms; it accomplishes
deterrence and retributive goals.113 Consideration of the origins and purpose of
the re-entry bars confirms as much. The first such measure appears to have been a
one-year bar adopted by Congress in 1917. It was initially applicable only in
deportation cases,114 and its history reveals a deterrent purpose. According to a
Senate Report, Congress adopted the re-entry bar to end “the quite extensive and
very annoying practice of aliens expelled from the country or debarred at the ports
thereof immediately reattempting to break past the barriers and enter.”115 In 1929
Congress extended the one-year bar to exclusion cases as well and made the
deportation bar permanent, without any statutory waiver provision.116
Upon enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952, Congress

108. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 243 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (describing
deportation).
109. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (2006). This bar on lawful return may be waived by the
Attorney General. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii).
110. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). This bar on lawful return may be waived by the Attorney General.
Id. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii).
111. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(A). These bars on lawful return may be waived by the Attorney General.
Id. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii).
112. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A). The statutory category “aggravated felony” is extremely
expansive and includes a wide range of misdemeanors and nonviolent offenses. See Nancy Morawetz,
Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 1936, 1939–41 (2000).
113. A person who illegally re-enters the United States to rejoin family members, but in
violation of the applicable bar, and who is then criminally prosecuted, see 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006), may
also be able to raise a traditional proportionality defense in that criminal prosecution, on either a
categorical or case-by-case basis.
114. Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 3, 30 Stat. 874, 876 (providing for
exclusion of “persons who have been deported under any of the provisions of this Act, and who may
again seek admission within one year from the date of such deportation” absent advance permission
from the Secretary of Labor).
115. S. REP. NO. 64-352, at 4 (1916).
116. Act of March 4, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-1018, § 1, 45 Stat. 1551, 1551 (amending 1917 reentry bar to apply to “persons who have been excluded from admission and deported in pursuance of
law”).
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retained the one-year re-entry bar for exclusion cases117 and also the draconian
permanent bar on re-entry in deportation cases,118 and made both subject to
waiver by the Attorney General. There does not seem to be legislative history
elaborating on the legislative intent motivating continuation of the re-entry bars,119
but it is hard to understand the bars in wholly remedial terms.
In 1982 Congress eliminated the permanent ban on re-entry in deportation
cases and substituted instead a five-year bar.120 The House Report noted that the
permanent re-entry bar served “little useful purpose,”121 and since the
Immigration and Nationality Service “routinely granted permission to re-enter” to
persons who had remained outside the United States for significant periods of
time after deportation,122 reducing the permanent re-entry bar to five years would
create “a direct economy by eliminating the need to adjudicate consent
applications.”123
Congress famously introduced the statutory term “aggravated felony” in the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, at which time it doubled the re-entry bar to ten
years “in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.”124 Two years
later, Congress doubled the re-entry bar again for aggravated felons to twenty
years.125 I am not aware of legislative history of the 1988 or 1990 Acts elaborating
on the purpose for extending the re-entry bar to twenty years for aggravated
felons.126
The most important recent revisions to the re-entry bars occurred with
enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA),127 in which Congress extended the re-entry bar in exclusion128
cases from one year to five years; extended the bar in deportation cases from five
years to ten years; extended the bar in aggravated felony cases from twenty years

117. Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 236, 66 Stat. 163, 183, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(16) (1952).
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 413 (1950).
120. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 4, 95 Stat.
1611, 1612.
121. COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 100th CONG., GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION OF ALIENS
UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT 138 (Comm. Print 1988) (quoting H.R. REP.
NO. 97-264, at 20 (1981)).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 4181.
125. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 4978.
126. See IGOR I. KAVASS & BERNARD D. REAMS, JR., THE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1990: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PUB. L. NO. 101-649 (1997), available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/
Index?index=leghis/lhimact&collection=leghis.
127. Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 3009-546.
128. IIRIRA substituted the term “removal” for what the INA had previously labeled
“exclusion” and “deportation” cases, but in substance preserved many of the distinctions between the
two proceedings. I continue to use the terms exclusion and deportation in this section for ease of
historic comparison.
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to a permanent bar; and created an additional twenty-year bar for illegal re-entry
cases.129 There is little direct legislative history of the extensions of the re-entry
bars,130 but there is evidence that Congress understood the purpose of the re-entry
bars to be punitive.
First, when Rep. Randy Tate offered an amendment on the House floor to
establish a permanent bar for anyone who entered or attempted to enter
unlawfully, a discussion of the purpose of re-entry bars occurred. Although the
Tate amendment failed, the floor debate centered on the re-entry bars in the
existing bill, which did become law, and confirm that Congress enacted these bars
to achieve punitive and deterrent purposes. Rep. Marge Roukema, for instance,
argued in support of the Tate amendment that “the one-strike-and-you’re-out
amendment will attach a real penalty to those who have crossed our borders
illegally. It is a common sense measure and it will prove to be a very effective
deterrent.”131 Rep. John Bryant objected that this amendment was unnecessary,
citing the re-entry bar provisions contained in the proposed legislation: “The bill
says already that you can exclude people from 5 years to 10 years depending on
the category they are in if they come into the country illegally and are ordered
removed. We have already got a stiff penalty in the bill.”132 Representative Xavier
Becerra opposed the Tate amendment on similar grounds, repeating that the
existing bill would extend the general re-entry bar to ten years, which “is very
severe punishment to serve.”133
Second, the history of a separate set of re-entry bars enacted in IIRIRA, the
three- and ten-year bars for unlawful presence in the United States of six or twelve
months, respectively,134 indicate that Congress generally intended re-entry bars as
punitive. The relevance of congressional debate on the unlawful presence bars to
the legislative purpose underlying extension of the re-entry bars is confirmed by
their placement in consecutive sections of IIRIRA, § 301(c)(A) and § 301(c)(B), as
well as their joint treatment in some committee reports.135 And the history of the
unlawful presence bars demonstrates an unmistakable intent to punish.
In a House Judiciary Committee hearing, Rep. Xavier Becerra proposed to
eliminate the unlawful presence bars, but the Chair, Rep. Henry Hyde, objected,
129. IIRIRA § 301 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §1182).
130. Replacement of the twenty-year re-entry bar for aggravated felons with a permanent bar
was proposed by Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.) during a committee mark-up, and opposed by Rep.
Jerrold Nadler (D-NY). Hearing of the House Judiciary Committee Markup, 104th Cong. (1995), available at
http://www.fednews.com. The record of the mark-up contains no meaningful discussion of the
purpose of the Goodlatte amendment.
131. 142 CONG. REC. 2378, 2459 (1996) (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 2458.
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. IIRIRA § 301.
135. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-169, at 528 (1996) (dissenting views) (characterizing extension of
re-entry bars and establishment of unlawful presence bars as “harsh new bans on the ability of aliens
to seek lawful entry into this country”).

Assembled_V2I1_v7_corrected (Do Not Delete)

434

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

5/16/2012 11:36 PM

[Vol. 2:415

explaining their purpose is “to validate our immigration laws, and to put some
penalty on people who cross into our country illegally or undocumentedly [sic].”136
Rep. Elton Gallegly agreed with Hyde, emphasizing that the re-entry bars for
unlawful presence were necessary because “if we don’t have penalties for illegal
immigration, for heaven’s sakes, how are we ever going to deal with this issue?”137
Rep. Howard Berman then offered an alternative amendment, softening but not
eliminating the new re-entry bars by establishing certain exceptions, while arguing
that the unlawful presence bars would create “a very harsh penalty.”138
Judicial opinions discussing the re-entry bars that result from removal
confirm that these are punitive, not remedial. In Dada v. Mukasey,139 for example,
the Supreme Court explained that a grant of voluntary departure (rather than entry
of a removal order) “allows an alien . . . to sidestep some of the penalties attendant
to deportation.”140 The first “penalt[y] attendant to deportation” listed by the
Dada Court was the re-entry bars.141 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has
also agreed that the purpose of the re-entry bars is to “compound the adverse
consequences of immigration violations,” accomplishing punitive and deterrence
goals.142 And various U.S. Courts of Appeals have characterized the re-entry bar as
a “penalty,”143 a “concrete disadvantage imposed as a matter of law,”144 and
“reflect[ing] a congressional intent to sever an alien’s ties to this country.”145
In short, the genesis of the re-entry bar in the 1917 Act was intended to
alleviate an administrative burden and achieve deterrence, but in 1952 and
emphatically in 1996 Congress hardened and recast the bar as a more severe
deterrent and to accomplish starkly punitive purposes. Courts, Congress, and the
BIA have consistently characterized the re-entry bars as a penalty intended to
punish immigration violations. Removal is a “civil sanction that cannot fairly be
said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also

136. Hearing of the House Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong. (1995), available at http://www.
fednews.com (emphasis added).
137. Id. (emphasis added) (Rep. John Bryant joined Rep. Xavier Becerra in opposing the reentry bars for unlawful presence at the same committee hearing, noting that their harsh operation
would “result in a flood of individual cases coming before this committee trying to get relief . . . And
every one of the cases . . . are going to be heart-rending and tear-jerking and probably meritorious and
we’re going to turn this committee into a virtual immigration court for the next several years”).
138. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. (remarks of Representative Berman) (“There is no doubt
a 10 year bar is a penalty.”).
139. 545 U.S. 1 (2008).
140. Id. at 11.
141. Id. at 11–12.
142. In re Raul Rodarte-Roman, 23 I. & N. Dec. 905, 909 (2006); see also id. (“It is recidivism,
and not mere unlawful presence, that section 212(a)(9) is designed to prevent.”); Lemus-Losa v.
Holder, 576 F.3d 752, 755 (7th Cir. 2009) (endorsing Rodarte-Roman analysis).
143. Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 2004).
144. Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 2001).
145. Juarez-Ramos v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 509, 512 (9th Cir. 2007).
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serving either retributive or deterrent purposes,”146 because its necessary and
inevitable consequence is the imposition of a bar on re-entry. Removal is therefore
punishment for Fifth Amendment proportionality purposes.
C. Case-by-Case Proportionality Review in Immigration Cases
The Supreme Court directs that the case-by-case proportionality inquiry in
criminal cases begins with a comparison between the gravity of the offense and
the severity of the sanction.147 Where there is an inference of gross
disproportionality, the court must then proceed to various forms of comparative
analysis, both intra- and interjurisdictional.148 In immigration cases, one can
imagine the analysis frequently ending at the first step, with courts concluding that
deportation and a bar on return for a period of years or on a permanent basis are
not grossly disproportionate to the underlying immigration offense.
But this will not always be so, just as it is not always the end of the analysis in
proportionality challenges to an award of punitive damages or to a criminal
sentence. Consider a DREAMer,149 a young adult who is undocumented and
arrived in this country with her parents as an infant or child. Or a refugee fleeing
violent persecution who is time barred from pursuing asylum because she was
unable to file an application within the one-year statute of limitations. Or a longterm permanent resident who came to this country legally as a small child and has
maintained her status ever since but, as an adolescent, was convicted of a
nonviolent offense, such as shoplifting or vehicle theft, that is now classified as an

146. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989); see also Austin v. United States, 509
U.S. 602, 620–22 (1993).
147. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290–91 (1983).
148. Id. at 296–300.
149. See, e.g., Tara Bahrampour, Students Raise Stakes Against Immigration’s Status Quo, WASH.
POST, July 21, 2010, available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/
2086440071.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Jul+21%2C+2010&author=Tara+Bahrampour
&desc=Students+raise+the+stakes+against+immigration%27s+status+quo (describing sit-ins
outside of the White House and Senate Office Building); see also Rhonda Bodfield, Four Arrested at
McCain Office Sit-in, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, May 18, 2010, available at http://azstarnet.com/
news/local/border/article_53c85e22-abeb-5507-9920-b6e4260212f9.html; Maggie Jones, Coming Out
Illegal, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 21, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/
magazine/24DreamTeam-t.html?pagewanted=all; David Montgomery, Trail of Dreams Students Walk
1,500 Miles to Bring Message to Washington, WASH. POST, May 1, 2010, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/30/AR2010043001384.html; Maria
Sacchetti, Students Here Illegally Rally in Hope of Living American Dream, BOSTON GLOBE, May 26, 2010,
available at https://secure.pqarchiver.com/boston/access/2041660871.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=
ABS:FT&type=current&date=May+26%2C+2010&author=Maria+Sacchetti&pub=Boston+Globe
&edition=&startpage=B.5&desc=Students+here+illegally+rally+in+hope+of+living+American+dre
am. The movement has continued into the fall. See, e.g., Diana Marcum, Students Want the Dream Act to
Become Reality, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2010, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/
28/local/la-me-dream-act-20101128.
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“aggravated felony.”150 There may well be deportation cases in which a court
should conclude that the severity of the sanction, namely removal and prohibition
on lawful return for a period of years, is so excessive in relation to the offense that
an “inference of gross disproportionality” arises.
Courts seem to have found some deportation orders excessive, but have
concluded they are powerless to void the orders. In one recent example, the
Eleventh Circuit wrestled with the “heartbreaking” case of a young mother of six
U.S. citizen children, who had come to this country as a child, escaped from two
abusive marriages, and who was ineligible for cancellation of removal, a form of
relief under the INA. “Simply put, this case calls for more mercy than the law
permits this Court to provide.”151 There are other such cases,152 but the courts
have been wrong to conclude they cannot intervene. The Constitution may not
compel mercy, it does require proportionality. The penalty of removal must not be
grossly excessive to the underlying offense.
If so, then to what, if anything, might one compare the sanction? In the
excessive fine case, Bajakajian, the Court looked to the criminal and civil penalties
apart from the fine.153 Here, they may be modest, much more so than the severity
of removal itself. For the DREAMer and the late-filing asylum seeker, entry
without inspection is a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum sentence of six
months,154 a civil fine of $50 to $250,155 and a criminal fine of $5,000,156 for
instance. The permanent resident convicted of shoplifting may have received no
jail time at all, only a suspended sentence.157
A court might also look beyond penalties authorized on the face of statutes
to actual sentencing and enforcement practices. The Supreme Court did precisely
that in Graham v. Florida, the life-without-parole case for nonhomicide juvenile
offenders, when it emphasized that few states pursue such harsh sentences, even
though most states authorize them.158 In immigration cases, it may be relevant that

150. Morawetz, supra note 112, at 1940; see INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 319 (2001)
(describing the retroactive effect of the IIRIRA’s expansion of the “aggravated felon” definition).
151. Martinez v. United States Attorney General, 413 F. App’x 163, 169 (11th Cir. 2011).
152. See Cheruku v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 662 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir. 2011) (McKee,
C.J., concurring); Martinez v. United States Att’y Gen., 413 F. App’x 163, 168 (11th Cir. 2011);
Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005) (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
153. 524 U.S. 321, 338–39 (1998).
154. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006).
155. Id. § 1325(b)(1).
156. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b) (2006).
157. The immigration statute directs that “[a]ny reference to a term of imprisonment” is
deemed to include the sentence of incarceration ordered, “regardless of any suspension of the
imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B) (2006) (defining
“conviction”).
158. 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010) (“Actual sentencing practices are an important part of the
Court’s inquiry into consensus.”).
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the United States does not deport many DREAMers.159 Immigration authorities
have also repeatedly declared their intent to prioritize the arrest and removal of
those who pose a threat to national security or public safety, as opposed to more
low-level offenders.160 Signaling the possibility that such enforcement practices
may be relevant in removal cases, a Ninth Circuit panel recently ordered the
Attorney General to address the effect of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement’s enforcement priorities “on the government’s continued
prosecution of the action in this case given that petitioners do not fall within any
of the categories of aliens deemed priorities by [Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE)] for deportation.”161
Notably, in 2011 the Director of ICE issued two memoranda affirming that
local ICE offices and prosecutors must exercise prosecutorial discretion in
decisions to arrest, detain, and remove.162 In many ways these memos merely
restated longstanding agency guidance discouraging removal of witnesses
cooperating with government investigations, military veterans, survivors of
domestic violence, and others,163 while explicitly extending such guidance to a few

159. Susan Carroll, Immigration Cases Being Tossed by the Hundreds: Docket Review Pulls Curtain Back
on Procedure by Homeland Security, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 16, 2010, available at http://www.
chron.com/news/article/Houston-immigration-cases-tossed-by-the-hundreds-1711874.php (noting that
ICE is dismissing cases where respondent has been present in the United States for two years or more
and has no serious criminal history).
160. Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Secretary, DHS, to U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Employees, Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension,
Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 30, 2010) (establishing those who pose “a danger to national
security or a risk to public safety” as “priority one,” recent illegal entrants as “priority two,” and
immigration fugitives or those who “otherwise obstruct immigration controls” as “priority three”),
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/civil_enforcement_priorities.pdf; see
also Alvarez v. Holder, No. 08-71383 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2011) (order requesting supplemental briefing
on the effect of the Morton Memorandum); CRISTINA RODRÍGUEZ, ET AL., A PROGRAM IN FLUX:
NEW PRIORITIES AND IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES FOR 287(G), at 12 (2010) (analyzing new
priorities for 287(g) agreements that prioritize persons convicted of violent crimes as “Level 1”),
available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-March2010.pdf.
161. Alvarez, No. 08-71383.
162. Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Secretary, DHS, to all U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Field Office Directors, Special Agents in Charge, and Chief Counsel,
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of
the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf [hereinafter
Morton Memo I]; Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Secretary, DHS, to all U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Field Office Directors, Special Agents in Charge, and Chief
Counsel, Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs (June 17, 2011), available
at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf [hereinafter Morton
Memo II].
163. See, e.g., Memorandum from Doris Meissner, INS Commissioner, to Immigration and
Naturalization Service Regional Directors, District Directors, Chief Patrol Agents, Regional and
District Counsel, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion (Nov. 17, 2000), available at http://www.
scribd.com/doc/22092970/INS-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-Doris-Meissner-11-7-00;
Memorandum from Julie L. Myers, Assistant Secretary, DHS, to all U.S. Immigration and Customs

Assembled_V2I1_v7_corrected (Do Not Delete)

438

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

5/16/2012 11:36 PM

[Vol. 2:415

additional categories of person, such as DREAMers and civil rights litigants.164 It
is yet unclear whether issuance of these prosecutorial discretion memos will alter
agency practices in any meaningful way, but on their face they appear to reflect an
agency internalization of the basic requirements of constitutional proportionality.
The imposition of re-entry bars should also be subject to proportionality
review. These bars on lawful return may violate case-by-case proportionality,
because they raise an inference of gross disproportionality and function as a civil
sentence that in many cases will be radically greater than any criminal sentence
that was or could have been imposed.165
Finally, a small number of persons ordered removed applied for relief but
were denied it, either because they failed to demonstrate a substantive ground for
relief—such as persecution for asylum166 or hardship for cancellation of
removal167—or were denied relief at the discretion of the immigration judge. An
immigration judge’s refusal to grant discretionary relief for which one has applied
and is eligible may also be subject to proportionality review on a case-by-case
basis. In such cases, a court may undertake a form of intrajurisdictional analysis by
comparing disposition of an instant case to others decided by the courts or the
BIA, which hears administrative appeals in removal cases.168 And, while the
immigration statutes generally bar review of the denial of discretionary
immigration relief other than asylum,169 the U.S. Courts of Appeals retain

Enforcement Field Office Directors and Special Agents in Charge, Prosecutorial and Custody
Discretion (Nov. 7, 2007), available at http://iwp.legalmomentum.org/ reference/additionalmaterials/immigration/enforcement-detention-and-criminal-justice/government-documents/Myers%
20Memo%20Custody%20Discretion%2011-7-07.pdf/view; former INS Operations Instruction
242.1(a)(18) (rescinded June 24, 1997) (discouraging deportation of veterans), reprinted in CHARLES
GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 242.1 (2011).
164. Morton Memo I, supra note 162, at 4 (DREAMers); Morton Memo II, supra note 162, at
2 (“[I]ndividals engaging in a protected activity related to civil or other rights . . . who may be in a
non-frivolous dispute with an employer, landlord, or contractor.”); see also Mary O’Leary, Appeal By
Illegal Immigrant From New Haven Helps Rewrite Policy, Puts Deportation On Hold, NEW HAVEN REGISTER,
June
23,
2011,
available
at
http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2011/06/21/news/
doc4e013e0124dcf017428516.prt.
165.
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 338–39 (1998) (comparing fine to potential
criminal penalties for underlying misconduct); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–83
(1996) (same as to punitive damage award).
166. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (2006) (Attorney General may grant asylum to person determined
to be “refugee” within meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)); id. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (refugee is one who
is unable to return to their country of nationality because of “persecution” or a “well-founded fear of
persecution”).
167. Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (among other criteria, nonpermanent resident who seeks
“cancellation of removal” must demonstrate “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to
qualifying relative).
168. Margot K. Mendelson, Note, Constructing America: Mythmaking in U.S. Immigration Courts,
119 YALE L.J. 1012 (2010) (examining BIA decisions on application for cancellation of removal and
discerning functional criteria applied by Board to sort meritorious and nonmeritorious cases).
169. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2006).
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jurisdiction to review constitutional claims.170 Therefore, a claim that one’s
removal violates constitutional proportionality requirements would be subject to
judicial review, even in a case involving the denial of discretionary relief.
D. Categorical Proportionality Review in Immigration Cases
As for the categorical approach in removal cases, a court applying existing
Eighth Amendment standards for proportionality review would begin with the
“objective indicia” of society’s standards, namely laws and practices.171 As above,
it is not generally the practice of immigration authorities to remove DREAMers.
ICE leadership has repeatedly emphasized, moreover, that it prioritizes for arrest
and removal those persons convicted of serious crimes, who pose a national
security or public safety threat, or who have previously been ordered removed but
failed to depart.172 ICE has also reaffirmed that its prosecutors and officials
possess the discretion to determine whether to proceed even in cases that could be
brought.173 There are other categories of persons who could be prosecuted in
removal proceedings, such as juveniles and the mentally ill, but generally are not
singled out in ICE enforcement programs.174 A categorical analysis might well
focus on such subgroups of persons subject to, but not usually targeted for,
removal.
The Court will then look to “the culpability of the offenders at issue in light
of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in
question.”175 The Court will also ask whether the sentencing practice “serves
legitimate penological goals.”176

170. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (INA does not preclude review of constitutional claims); INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 (2001) (bar to review “pure question of law” in removal cases would raise
“substantial constitutional questions”).
171. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572
(2005).
172. See supra notes 159–64 and accompanying text.
173. Morton Memo I, supra note 162, at 2–3.
174. ICE does arrest or place into removal proceedings substantial numbers of juveniles,
mentally ill persons, and low-level offenders, even though such persons are not within the agency’s
enforcement priorities. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ACLU, DEPORTATION BY DEFAULT:
MENTAL DISABILITY, UNFAIR HEARINGS, AND INDEFINITE DETENTION IN THE US
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM (2010) (“While no exact official figures exist, the percentage of non-citizens
in immigration proceedings with a mental disability is estimated to be at least 15 percent of the total
immigrant population in detention.”); AARTI SHAHANI, NEW YORK CITY ENFORCEMENT OF
IMMIGRATION DETAINERS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 1 (2010) (“While Homeland Security purports
to target the most dangerous offenders [at Rikers Island jail], there appears to be no correlation
between offense level and identification for deportation.”), available at http://www.justicestrategies.org/
sites/default/files/publications/JusticeStrategies-DrugDeportations- PrelimFindings.pdf.
175. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
176. Id.
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The Supreme Court has emphasized the diminished culpability of juveniles
in Roper 177 and Graham 178 and those with low intellectual functioning in Ford 179 and
Atkins.180 In discussing juveniles, the Court has explained that “[a]s compared to
adults, juveniles have a ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility;’”181 and therefore, while a juvenile “is not absolved of responsibility
for his actions[,] . . . his transgression ‘is not as morally reprehensible as that of an
adult.’”182 Surely the lack of moral culpability of an infant carried across the
border by his mother, or of a severely mentally ill person, diminishes the
reprehensibility of his conduct. And the severity of the sentence imposed on one
who is mentally ill or who has never really lived in a country of birth, does not
speak the language, and has no close family, is undeniably acute.
As for the penological goals, removal of DREAMers and others not targeted
for enforcement by ICE, will incapacitate, but it cannot deter future infants, for
instance, nor is it likely to deter other juvenile offenders for the reasons elaborated
by the Court in Graham.183 Nor is removal of such persons likely to lead to
rehabilitation for the immigration violation. Nor, finally, is it clear that removal in
such instances will serve retributive purposes. To the extent retribution is even
appropriate for an immigration violation; philosophers and criminal law scholars
agree that achieving retribution in a victimless offense situation can be particularly
difficult.184
There will be other applications of the categorical approach to
proportionality in immigration law. The immigration statutes for more than a
century have contained a sort of statute of limitations, called registry. This
provision directs that a person who entered the United States before January 1,
1972, has resided here continuously, and is of good moral character may obtain
LPR status.185 The statute effectively creates a statute of limitations, or rather, a
cutoff date for enforcement of immigration law. For most of the past century,
177. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
death penalty for juvenile offenders).
178. Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits life without
parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders).
179. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
execution of prisoner who is insane).
180. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the execution of mentally retarded criminals).
181. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70).
182. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)); see also id.
(“[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between
juvenile and adult minds.”).
183. Id. at 21 (discussing retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, and
emphasizing that juveniles are immature and “less likely to take a possible punishment into
consideration when making decisions”); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 (“[J]uveniles will be less
susceptible to deterrence.”).
184. Von Hirsch, supra note 5, at 82 n.7.
185. 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (2006).
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Congress periodically revised this statute to ensure the limitations period was
much briefer. The 1972 date was fixed by Congress in 1986, for instance, replacing
the prior date of June 30, 1948.186 The 1948 date was itself established in 1965 to
replace June 28, 1940,187 and so on back into the 1920s—a long tradition of an
enforcement deadline of approximately fifteen to twenty years for immigration
offenses.188 It may be that removal of a person who has been present for, say,
twenty years and is of good moral character is grossly disproportionate to the
underlying offense.
Similarly, it may be that the expansive definition of “aggravated felony” in
immigration law, which encompasses a long and growing list of crimes from
murder to misdemeanor theft offenses, raises categorical proportionality
problems.189 That is because one convicted of an “aggravated felony” is not only
subject to removal but also barred from immigration relief. Removal as the
automatic consequence of a minor or nonviolent crime may be grossly
disproportional to the gravity of the offense, in violation of Eighth and Fifth
Amendment proportionality requirements.
Finally, the re-entry bars discussed above may also categorically violate the
constitutional requirement of proportionality, and not only in the case of juveniles,
the mentally ill, or those convicted only of nonviolent criminal offenses. A
permanent bar on the lawful return of one convicted of a minor crime that is
nevertheless classified as an “aggravated felony” by the immigration statutes may
contravene the due process requirement of proportionality. It may also be, for
example, that imposition of the ten-year bar on lawful return for persons ordered
removed violates proportionality when applied to adults who have resided for
many years in the United States, even without status, and who have children, a
spouse, or strong community ties here.
E. Proportionality Review by Immigration Judges
The obligation to conduct a proportionality review of entry of a removal
order is imposed by statute as well as the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. The
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) directs that “[a]t the conclusion of the
proceeding the immigration judge shall decide whether an alien is removable from
the United States.”190 The canon of constitutional doubt191 requires that this
186. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 203(a)–(b), 100
Stat. 3359, 3405 (1986) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (2006)).
187. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 19, 79 Stat. 911, 920 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1259 (2006)).
188. See Richard A. Boswell, Crafting an Amnesty with Traditional Tools: Registration and
Cancellation, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 180–90 (2010).
189. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006); Morawetz, supra note 112, at 1939.
190. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (2006).
191. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
689 (2001); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300–01 (2001); see generally infra note 217. See William N.
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provision not be construed to permit an immigration judge to order removal in
violation of constitutional proportionality requirements.192 In other words, this
statute must be interpreted to incorporate, in the immigration judge’s decision, an
evaluation of whether removal would be impermissibly disproportionate to the
gravity of the underlying misconduct. Accordingly, immigration judges and
members of the BIA must evaluate removal orders for excessiveness.
The canon holds that where “an otherwise acceptable construction of a
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, and where an alternative
interpretation of the statute is ‘fairly possible,’ [a court is] obligated to construe the
statute to avoid such problems.”193 In other words, courts should presume that
Congress intended to legislate “in the light of constitutional limitations,”194 and
prefer a construction that “preserv[es] congressional enactments that might
otherwise founder on constitutional objections.”195 The principle is often
associated with Justice Brandeis for his Ashwander opinion,196 but is of older
origin,197 dating at least to the opinion of Chief Justice John Marshall in Murray v.
The Charming Betsy.198 And while scholars have debated the wisdom of the canon,
and in particular whether it invites or curbs judicial activism,199 the Supreme Court
regularly deploys it to analyze statutes. One of its most forceful explicators is
Justice Scalia. In a case involving an immigration crime, for instance, he explained,
“This ‘cardinal principle,’ which ‘has for so long been applied by this Court that it

Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1020–22 (1989)
(cautioning against reflexive invocation of canon of constitutional avoidance); Adrian Vermeule,
Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945 (1997) (discussing the relationship between the canon of
avoidance and the doctrine of severability).
192. See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682, 689 (applying constitutional avoidance canon to
interpret 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (that certain persons ordered removed “may be detained beyond the
removal period”) to include “reasonable time” limitation); Clark, 543 U.S. at 385–86 (affirming the
Zadvydas Court’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)).
193. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299–300 (internal citations omitted).
194. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991).
195. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998); see generally Frickey, supra
note 21.
196. 297 U.S. 288, 348–49 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See also United States v. Jin Fuey
Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916) (Holmes, J.) (“A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to
avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.”).
197. See N.L.R.B. v. Cath. Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 499 (1979) (attributing canon to “Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall’s admonition in Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804) . . . that
an Act of Congress ought not be construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible
construction remains available”).
198. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); see also Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the
Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1203 n.49 (2006) (noting view that avoidance canon
originates with Charming Betsy and alternative theory that principle arose even earlier).
199. Compare JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 105 (1997), and Vermeule, supra note 191, and Ernest Young,
Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549
(2000), with Frickey, supra note 21.
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is beyond debate,’ requires merely a determination of serious constitutional doubt,
and not a determination of unconstitutionality.”200
The Supreme Court has applied the constitutional doubt canon in
immigration cases.201 Of particular relevance, it has done so in cases involving a
substantive due process challenge like the Fifth Amendment proportionality claim
discussed here.202 This is significant because the plenary power doctrine of
immigration law, while widely and properly condemned,203 holds that immigration
statutes are immune from substantive due process challenge—which would
therefore appear to render the INA free of “constitutional doubt” in the face of
such challenges. Yet in United States v. Witkovich,204 the Supreme Court adopted a
statutory interpretation favorable to the immigrant so as to avoid a substantive
due process problem, even though, as one scholar of statutory interpretation drily
noted, the “constitutional values in play were not well established at the time.”205
More recently, in Zadvydas v. Davis,206 the Court applied the constitutional
doubt canon to interpret 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which authorizes the Attorney
General to detain persons “beyond the removal period,” so as to incorporate a
reasonable time limitation.207 Without question, Zadvydas involved a substantive
due process challenge to the statute,208 notwithstanding a century of case law
200. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Building & Const. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
201. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001) (interpreting immigration statute
precluding judicial review of certain deportation orders not to bar challenge on habeas petition to
same orders); United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 199 (1957) (adopting narrow construction of
immigration statute authorizing supervision of persons subject to deportation order and explaining
that “[a] restrictive meaning for what appear to be plain words may be indicated by . . . the rule of
constitutional adjudication . . . that such a restrictive meaning must be given if a broader meaning
would generate constitutional doubts”).
202. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
203. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
204. 53 U.S. 194 (1957).
205. Frickey, supra note 21, at 451 (in Witkovich, “the constitutional question was murky”); see
also Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194. Frickey argues that the Witkovich opinion was an important illustration of
use of the avoidance canon to promote a dialogue between the Court and Congress, “defuse political
opposition while incrementally adjusting public law to better respect individual liberty,” and “allow[ ]
the Court to play a game of high-stakes politics, to correct individual injustice in some circumstances,
and to protect its independence and future autonomy.” Frickey, supra note 21, at 401, 457. Much the
same may be said of the current state of immigration law, and the Court’s engagement with Congress
at a time of intense public debate over immigration. See Markowitz, supra note 82, at 1346 & n.190
(calculating that immigrants have prevailed in sixty-three percent of cases decided by the Roberts
Court).
206. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
207. Id. at 689 (discussing constitutional doubt canon and holding “[f]or similar reasons, we
read an implicit limitation into the statute before us”); see also Clark, 543 U.S. at 380–82.
208. The Zadvydas majority relied on, cited to, and quoted from substantive due process
decisions. 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citing to Foucha v. Louisiana passage regarding “substantive
component” of Due Process Clause, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) and to Kansas v. Hendricks, which rejected
substantive due process challenge to civil confinement of sexual predators, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997)).
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holding that immigration statutes are exempt from such challenge.209 In a
companion case to Zadvydas decided four years later, Justice Scalia elaborated the
rationale for the canon when applying it to construe the same immigration statute,
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), once again so as to avoid a substantive due process
difficulty. “[O]ne of the canon’s chief justifications,” he explained, “is that it
allows courts to avoid the decision of constitutional questions. It is a tool for
choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on
the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises
serious constitutional doubts.”210
Returning to the question of proportionality review, 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(c)(1)(A) provides that “[a]t the conclusion of the [removal] proceeding, the
immigration judge shall decide whether an alien is removable from the United
States.”211 This authorization for an immigration judge to enter a removal order
should be construed to include a restriction on imposition of an order that is
excessive in relation to the underlying offense. One may counter that the plain
language of the statute imposes no proportionality requirement, and further that
Congress has taken proportionality concerns into account in fashioning certain
waivers and categories of relief from deportation.212 On the other hand, to
paraphrase the Court’s opinion in Zadvydas, a statute permitting the immigration
judge to enter a removal order that was grossly disproportional to the underlying
misconduct would raise a serious constitutional problem.213 Pursuant to the
avoidance canon, upon “a determination of serious constitutional doubt,”214 a court
must presume that Congress did not intend to enact a statute authorizing an
unconstitutional outcome. The BIA has held that this same avoidance canon is
applicable in the administrative setting and binding on immigration judges.215

It did not, however, conduct the classic procedural due process analysis required by Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1975).
209. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724, 730 (1893) (rejecting
substantive challenge to deportation statute); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese
Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 599 (1889) (rejecting substantive challenge to exclusion statute).
210. Clark, 543 U.S. at 381; see also id. at 382 (“The canon is thus a means of giving effect to
congressional intent, not of subverting it.”).
211. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (2006).
212. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006) (political asylum); id. § 1229b (cancellation of removal).
213. Cf. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“A statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would
raise a serious constitutional problem.”).
214. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 250 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(internal quotations and citations omitted, emphasis in original).
215. In re Q-T-M-T-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 639, 667–68 (1996) (“Although we do not decide the
constitutionality of the statutes which we interpret, our role is to construe statutes to achieve results
which are consistent, rather than in conflict, with constitutional protections.”); In re Leoncio
Crisoforo Gonzalez-Camarillo, 21 I. & N. Dec. 937, 953 (1997) (“It is a basic canon of statutory
construction that where we can interpret a statute so as to avoid any constitutional infirmity, we
should do so.”).
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Because a construction of § 1229a(c)(1)(A) that would permit an immigration
judge to impose a removal order that is grossly disproportional to the underlying
misconduct creates at least “serious constitutional doubt,” the statute must be
interpreted to contain a proportionality limitation. This analysis is consistent with
the rationale of the Court in Zadvydas and Martinez, where it construed § 1231(a)(6)
to contain a “reasonable time” limitation on post-final order detention, as well as
the reasoning of St. Cyr, where the Court construed § 1252 not to preclude habeas
review of certain deportation orders. In “decid[ing] whether an alien is removable
from the United States,”216 the immigration judge must determine that the penalty
of removal is not excessive in relation to the underlying misconduct.217
This construction of § 1229a(c)(1)(A) would also serve the best purposes of
the avoidance canon. If Philip Frickey is correct that the constitutional doubt
canon “provides a means to mediate the borderline between statutory
interpretation and constitutional law . . . where judicial line-drawing is especially
difficult and where underenforced constitutional values are at stake,”218 then
interpreting § 1229a(c)(1)(A) to incorporate a proportionality review makes a great
deal of sense. There are few areas of law where constitutional values are more
underenforced than immigration law.219 And as Frickey himself noted, “[B]old
constitutional lawmaking protecting the rights of [immigrants] may be unlikely”220
in the current era. As it did in the 1950s, therefore, “the Court may find it useful
to return . . . to the avoidance canon to mediate statutory or administrative
harshness and constitutional values” in immigration cases.221
III. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
There are three principal objections to the claim that removal orders are
subject to proportionality review.
A. The Plenary Power Doctrine
One might object that the “plenary power doctrine” of immigration law bars
judicial review of substantive immigration law, therefore foreclosing constitutional

216. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (2006).
217. It follows as well that on appeal of the immigration judge’s decision, the BIA must also
review the decision of the immigration judge for conformity to constitutional proportionality
requirements.
218. Frickey, supra note 21, at 402.
219. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) (arguing that plenary power
doctrine has distorted immigration jurisprudence and forced courts to incorporate basic constitutional
norms through statutory interpretation).
220. Frickey, supra note 21, at 403 (comparing circumstance of immigrants after September 11
to alleged Communists in the 1950s and lauding application of avoidance canon in St. Cyr and
Zadvydas decisions).
221. Id.
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proportionality review. The plenary power doctrine was born in the Plesssy v.
Ferguson era222 and reaffirmed in a series of decisions in the McCarthy years.223 It
justifies judicial deference to executive and congressional choices regarding
deportation proceedings based on the exigencies of foreign affairs and the
demands of national security. “The power of congress to exclude aliens altogether
from the United States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they
may come to this country, and to have its declared policy in that regard enforced
exclusively through executive officers, without judicial intervention, is settled by
our previous adjudications.”224 In a more recent but no less forceful statement, the
Supreme Court explained that “any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately
interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign
relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of
government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of
government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.”225 The
Court has specifically held that the plenary power doctrine bars substantive due
process challenges to deportation statutes,226 and thus arguably poses an obstacle
to the argument that the Constitution requires proportionality review of removal
orders.
Of course, nearly every modern immigration scholar has condemned the
“plenary power doctrine” as erroneous and a shameful relic of the Plessy era, one
that has left immigration a legal backwater out of step with developments in
modern constitutional law.227 This is true. Moreover, the plenary power doctrine
222. In a series of late-nineteenth century decisions, the Supreme Court held that persons in
“exclusion” proceedings at the nation’s borders could invoke neither the procedural nor the
substantive elements of the Due Process Clause and that persons physically present in the country
and placed in “deportation” proceedings could bring procedural, but not substantive, due process
challenges. See Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724, 730 (1893) (rejecting substantive challenge to deportation
statute); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (rejecting procedural challenge to
exclusion statute); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 599
(1889) (rejecting substantive challenge to exclusion statute).
223. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591 (1952) (“We think that, in the
present state of the world, it would be rash and irresponsible to reinterpret our fundamental law to
deny or qualify the Government’s power of deportation.”).
224. Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895).
225. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588–89 (footnote omitted); see also, Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S.
21, 34 (1982) (“[I]mmigration is a sovereign prerogative, largely within the control of the executive
and the legislature.”); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765–67 (1972).
226. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. 698.
227. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional
Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998) (arguing that plenary power doctrine arose from Plessyera judicial commitment to racial segregation); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States
Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 863 (1987)
(“Chinese Exclusion—its very name is an embarrassment—must go.”); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten
More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925 (1995);
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) (arguing that plenary power doctrine has distorted
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may be coming to play a less central role in the adjudication of immigration cases.
In recent years the Supreme Court has regularly rejected the government’s
position in removal cases, even while espousing deference to the legislative and
executive branches,228 and even in cases in which national security concerns are
present.229 In particular, in Zadvydas and Martinez the Court agreed that a
substantive due process challenge to an immigration law raised constitutional
doubt about the validity of the statute—holdings necessarily premised on the view
that the plenary power doctrine does not foreclose all substantive due process
challenges in immigration law. Similarly, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to
apply other constitutional principles in the face of plenary power arguments.230
Further, even accepting that some judicial deference is appropriate in
removal cases, the plenary power doctrine does not preclude a constitutional
proportionality analysis. As noted, in Padilla v. Kentucky the Court held that
“deportation is an integral part . . . of the penalty that may be imposed on
noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”231 Thus,
proportionality review in cases where removal is the inevitable consequence of a
criminal conviction is required by the Eighth Amendment as well. The plenary
power cases barring substantive due process challenges to deportation do not
preclude an Eighth Amendment proportionality challenge.
Further, even as to removal orders that are not the result of a criminal
conviction, a case-by-case proportionality analysis is not a facial challenge to
grounds of removability, such as might be precluded by the plenary power
doctrine. Case-by-case proportionality review is an as-applied challenge, which
does not implicate the plenary power doctrine quite so directly. In most cases, it
will implicate neither foreign affairs nor national security, as the overwhelming

immigration jurisprudence and forced courts to incorporate basic constitutional norms through
statutory interpretation).
228. See, e.g., Dada v. Mukasey, 545 U.S. 1 (2008); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004)
(conviction under Florida’s driving-under-the-influence statute not an aggravated felony for
immigration purposes).
229. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
230. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (applying constitutional avoidance doctrine to
construe immigration detention statute as permitting post-final order detention for only six months,
absent evidence of dangerousness or foreseeable removal, in light of significant due process concerns
raised by alternative statutory interpretation urged by government); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289
(2001) (Suspension Clause requires judicial review of at least questions of law in deportation orders).
231. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010) (emphasis added). Many prior cases had stated that
deportation was not punishment. See, e.g., Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) (“It is well settled that
deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not a punishment.”); Bugajewitz
v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) (“It is thoroughly established that Congress has power to order
the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful. The determination . . . is not
a conviction of crime, nor is the deportation a punishment; it is simply a refusal by the government to
harbor persons whom it does not want.”).

Assembled_V2I1_v7_corrected (Do Not Delete)

448

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

5/16/2012 11:36 PM

[Vol. 2:415

majority of individual deportation cases do not.232 Alternatively, it may be that
courts ultimately conclude that a diminished version of the proportionality review
required in criminal cases is applicable in immigration proceedings, just as they
have done with the exclusionary rule,233 and have implied with the prohibition on
selective enforcement.234 A categorical proportionality claim would concededly be
a more explicit challenge to the plenary power doctrine, but it is surely no less
invasive of federal sovereignty than the invalidation of state capital punishment or
life-without-parole sentences for juveniles is of state sovereignty.
Finally, the plenary power objection does not bar the conclusion that 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) itself should be construed to incorporate proportionality
requirements, such that a review for excessiveness is required in the immigration
judge’s “deci[sion] whether an alien is removable from the United States.”
B. The Continuing Offense Objection
One might next object that an immigration violation is a continuing offense,
and thus for a court to prohibit removal on the ground that it violated a
proportionality principle would be to allow continued illegality.235 The Supreme
Court recently emphasized this point in a case arising in a somewhat different
context. There, the Court explained that an immigration statute allowing
reinstatement of a prior deportation order against one who illegally re-enters after
removal “applies to stop an indefinitely continuing violation that the alien himself
could end at any time by voluntarily leaving the country.”236 Similarly, one might
object that the presence of all foreign nationals, even lawful permanent residents,
is not a “right but is a matter of permission and tolerance.”237
As a preliminary matter, where deportation may be imposed as part of the
criminal penalty on a legal immigrant, the continuing offense problem does not
232. Cf. Kleindiest v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to
denial of visa waiver to European intellectual).
233. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (exclusionary rule of criminal cases
does not generally apply in civil removal proceedings but may apply in cases of “egregious” violations
of Fourth Amendment or other rights); Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231 (2d Cir. 2006)
(holding exclusionary rule applies in removal proceedings in case of egregious violations); GonzalezRivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); see generally Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to
Believe”: Widespread Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting
Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109 (2008) (critiquing application of watered-down version of
exclusionary rule in immigration cases).
234. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (prohibition on
selective enforcement in criminal cases does not generally apply in civil removal proceedings, but may
apply in cases of “outrageous” discrimination).
235. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1039 (“The purpose of deportation is not to punish past
transgressions but rather to put an end to a continuing violation of the immigration laws.”); Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982) (characterizing immigration proceedings as legal measures through
“which aliens can be denied the hospitality of the United States”).
236. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 44 (2006).
237. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586–87 (1952).
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necessarily arise. That is, there is no “continuing offense” difficulty if a court were
to hold that a removal order against an LPR offender were to be invalidated as a
sanction that is grossly disproportionate to the underlying criminal offense.
Similarly, for a foreign national eligible for but denied immigration relief, where
the denial was in violation of constitutional proportionality requirements, there
would be no “continuing offense problem,” because the remedy would be to
overturn the refusal to grant the relief. This outcome would confer lawful status
and eliminate any continuing offense concern.238
The “continuing offense” objection to proportionality review is strongest in
the context of an undocumented immigrant who is not eligible for any relief. But
even here it fails. There are many circumstances in immigration law in which
immigration judges or the courts will dismiss a removal proceeding, restoring the
respondent to the status quo ante—including, specifically, allowing an apparently
undocumented person to walk out of the courtroom at liberty. Such cases include
those in which the government fails to carry its initial burden of proof to establish
“alienage,”239 for instance where the court has granted a suppression motion
excluding the government’s evidence of alienage,240 or where the government has
violated its own regulations in the conduct of the arrest, interrogation, or
prosecution of the respondent.241 These dismissals without prejudice permit the
government to refile a new removal case in the future, but they do result in
dismissing a particular removal proceeding, notwithstanding the continuing
offense concern. The decision by an immigration judge not to enter a removal
order (or of a reviewing court not to affirm an order previously entered) because it
would be grossly disproportional to the underlying misconduct would stand in the

238. The Supreme Court has characterized the grant of discretionary immigration relief as “an
act of grace” done pursuant to the Attorney General’s “unfettered discretion,” Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S.
345, 354 (1956), comparable to “a judge’s power to suspend the execution of a sentence, or the
President’s to pardon a convict.” Id. at 354 n.16. See also INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 30
(1996). Nevertheless, even the exercise of discretion in granting immigration relief is subject to
constitutional requirements. See, e.g., Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (no bar
generally to selective enforcement in immigration cases except in circumstance of “outrageous”
discrimination).
239. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2006) (“[T]he Service has the burden of establishing by clear
and convincing evidence that, in the case of an alien who has been admitted to the United States, the
alien is deportable.”); Lopez-Chavez v. INS, 259 F.3d 1176, 1180–81 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); Murphy
v. INS, 54 F.3d 605, 608–09 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that government bears burden to establish
alienage because it is a jurisdictional fact on which authority of immigration court to conduct
deportation proceeding depends).
240. See, e.g., Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding
exclusionary rule applies in removal proceedings in cases of egregious violations and directing
exclusion of evidence based on warrantless entry into private home, in egregious violation of Fourth
Amendment); Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding exclusionary rule
applies in removal proceedings in cases of egregious violations).
241. See, e.g., Singh v. United States Department of Justice, 461 F.3d 290, 296–97 (2d Cir.
2006) (violations of regulations or rules warrant termination of immigration proceedings).
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same tradition: it would terminate the instant proceeding, without barring the
government from renewing its prosecution in the future.
Nor, in any event, can the continuing offense objection defeat the
constitutional proposition. First, the re-entry bars may be unconstitutionally
excessive in a particular case. These bars go well beyond mere cessation of
unlawful conduct; they are enduring sentences. In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme
Court held that a juvenile sentenced to life imprisonment must be afforded “some
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.”242 A juvenile ordered removed may be constitutionally entitled to
some similar opportunity to demonstrate “maturity and rehabilitation” so as
lawfully to return to the United States. The immigration statute does authorize a
waiver of the bars on lawful return,243 but the agency regulation implementing this
provision states that no one may apply for such a waiver until five years after
removal, or twenty years if removed following conviction for an aggravated
felony.244 Furthermore, agency guidance appears to direct that such waivers be
granted only very infrequently.245 The regulation and the agency guidance may not
be consistent with constitutional proportionality requirements in individual cases.
Nor can the “continuing offense” objection overcome the proportionality
requirement as applied to a removal order itself, even an order entered against an
undocumented person who is ineligible for relief. At a minimum, proportionality
may require deferral of execution of a removal order, for instance, until the U.S.
citizen children of an undocumented adult complete high school or otherwise
reach the age of majority. In other circumstances, removal prior to other
important events in one’s familial, religious, or professional life may violate
proportionality principles. So too might removal that would divest one of a
meaningful opportunity to participate as a witness or party in pending legal
proceedings.246 More broadly, it may be that the Due Process Clause’s
242. 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
243. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) (2006).
244. 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(a) (2011).
245. See, e.g., Dragon v. INS, 748 F.2d 1304, 1306–07 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Lee, 17 I. & N.
Dec. 275 (1978) (relevant factors in adjudicating application for readmission include moral character,
recency of deportation, need for person’s service in U.S., and duration of residency in U.S.); In re Tin,
14 I. & N. Dec. 371, 373–74 (1973). Many persons removed would also confront a second set of bars
on lawful return, those set forth at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i) (person unlawfully present in United
States for six months may not re-enter for three years, and one unlawfully present for one year may
not re-enter for ten years). There are a number of exceptions, id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii), and also a narrow
statutory waiver. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).
246. Morton Memo II, supra note 162, at 1–2 (discouraging removal of victims of crime or
civil rights violation, or witness in pending proceedings). See also 8 C.F.R. § 241.6(a) (2011) (ICE
officials may grant stay of removal “in consideration of factors listed in 8 C.F.R. 212.5”); id. §
212.5(b)(4) (listing persons “who will be witnesses in proceedings being, or to be, conducted by
judicial, administrative, or legislative bodies in the United States”); former INS Operations Instruction
287.3a, redesignated as § 33.14(h) of the INS Special Agent’s Field Manual (Apr. 2000) (directing that
“arrangements for aliens to be held or to be interviewed” by state or federal labor inspectors or
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proportionality requirement does, in fact, permanently bar the removal of certain
categories of undocumented immigrants ineligible for relief, such as the
DREAMers or those with low mental functioning, as discussed above. It may
even permanently bar the removal of certain individuals in extreme situations,
pursuant to case-by-case proportionality analysis.
C. Lack of Comparative Metrics
Finally, one might object that there are fewer available benchmarks for
making the comparative assessments that are common to capital, noncapital, and
civil proportionality analyses. While the metrics will differ from those used in
other proportionality contexts, they are not wholly absent in the immigration
context, and scholarship and judicial opinions may help to develop them further.
For instance, the sort of intrajurisdictional comparison called for by Solem,
Hamelin, and other decisions in the case-by-case lines may be possible in some
instances in removal cases,247 particularly where an applicant has been denied relief
on factual circumstances that, in other cases, have resulted in a grant of relief.248
Similarly, as in the punitive damages and excessive fine cases, there may be a
useful comparison between the lifetime consequences of deportation and the
modest civil or criminal penalties authorized for some of the underlying
immigration offenses.249
***
Respondents in removal proceedings might argue that their removal would
violate the principles of proportionality inherent in the Due Process Clause, which
indisputably governs removal proceedings, and the Eighth Amendment, which
after Padilla may as well, at least where removal is the result of a criminal
conviction. In addition, the statutory provision authorizing an immigration judge
to “decide whether an alien is removable from the United States” must be read to
incorporate the constitutional proportionality requirement. Proportionality claims
might arise where the immigration courts have denied an application for relief
from one eligible to request it, or even where no relief is authorized. Courts will
honor these principles, and Supreme Court precedent, by adjudicating both caseattorneys, prior to removal, “will be determined on a case-by-case basis”) reprinted in 74 No. 4
Interpreter Releases 188 App’x. IV (Jan. 27, 1997); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(S) (2006) (establishing “S”
visa category for certain cooperating witnesses necessary to a criminal investigation or prosecution);
id. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (establishing “U” visa category for victims of listed crimes).
247. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 (1983).
248. Mendelson, supra note 168.
249. See supra notes 51–61 and accompanying text. A skeptic might also raise the “floodgates”
concern, noting that the U.S. Courts of Appeals must already adjudicate enormous numbers of
immigration appeals. See, e.g., John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration Surge in the
Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 13 (2006). But the courts are
quite capable of applying legal rules “to separate specious claims from those with substantial merit,”
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (rejecting “floodgates” objection), and have not
been overwhelmed with proportionality claims in the criminal or punitive damages context.
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by-case and categorical proportionality challenges. In appropriate cases, including
those heartbreaking ones where an unjust and unreasonable outcome is otherwise
inevitable, Article III and administrative courts should find that removal is so
grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense as to be forbidden by the
INA and the Constitution.

